We examine the real effect of privatization in terms of corporate innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in privatization expectations generated by China's split share structure reform, which mandatorily converts non-tradable shares to be freely tradable and opens up the gate to the further privatization of state-owned enterprises. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find privatization prospects have a positive effect on innovation. Better interest alignments between government agents and private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness appear two plausible underlying mechanisms. Further, the effect of privatization on innovation is more pronounced in less market economy oriented provinces. Our paper sheds new light on the real effects of privatization.
Introduction
Privatization, namely, the deliberate sales of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or assets by a government to private economic agents, has attracted a lot of attention and debate among academics, practitioners, and policy makers in the past a few decade regarding its economic impact. Advocates claim that privatization removes market frictions, improves risk sharing, lowers agency costs, and facilitates efficient resource allocations, which improves productivity and economic efficiency. Critics, however, argue that privatization leads to social and economic instability, declines in national economic growth, acuter expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders, and asset sales by governments at excessively low prices. 1 Given the mixed and inclusive evidence on the real effects of privatization, it is important to understand the effect of privatization on technological innovation, which is probably the most important driver of a country's economic growth and competitive advantages (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1986; and Porter, 1992) . The goal of this paper is to further our understanding regarding the effect of privatization on corporate innovation, which sheds new light on the debate on the economic consequences of privatization.
Existing research, however, does not provide a clear guidance on how privatization affects corporate innovation. Privatization can spur corporate innovation for at least two reasons. First, privatization reduces the conflict of interest between government agents (i.e., controlling shareholder and managers) and private shareholders. While SOEs are owned by all people in a country in theory, they are controlled by government agents. A primary concern over state ownership is that government agents could use their control rights to engage in rent seeking or politically motivated resource allocations (Shleifer, 1998) . Better interest alignment, as a result of privatization, will lead to more efficient resource allocations, including allocations to innovation projects. Second, the stock market will provide more information about SOEs and hence the stock prices of SOEs become more informative after privatization (Gupta, 2005; BenNasr and Cosset, 2014) . The additional information incorporated in stock prices could be used to monitor managers or make more informed corporate investment decisions, such as technological innovation.
There are, however, a few alternative arguments that suggest privatization could impede corporate innovation. First, innovation activities not only generate financial returns to corporations, but also create social benefits to the society as a whole (Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996) . Because SOEs carry more social responsibilities than non-SOE firms (Gan, Guo, and 1 See, e.g., Megginson (2010) , for a comprehensive survey of the privatization literature. Xu, 2008) , they may have more incentives to invest in innovation for social welfare concerns.
Consistent with this view, Hall (1996) points out that the gap between private and social returns to innovative activities is the principal argument for government interventions in industrial innovation. Therefore, after privatization, the reduction in government influence on SOEs could adversely affect their innovation activities. Second, SOEs face increased pressures from the financial market after privatization because stock market participants tend to pay more attention to their financial performance than government-affiliated owners. Existing evidence shows that short-term pressure from the financial market has negative effects on innovation outcomes. For example, He and Tian (2013) find that analysts exert too much pressure on managers to meet short-term targets, impeding firms' investment in long-term innovative projects. Chemmanur and Tian (2018) show that pressures from hostile takeovers alter managers' incentives and stifle corporate innovation.
While there are likely merits to both sides of these arguments, in practice it is difficult to identify the causal effect of privatization on corporate innovation, due to its endogenous nature.
First, a sample of traditional share issue privatizations (SIPs) that is commonly used by the existing literature tend to bias towards the very largest firms sold through privatization programs, causing a selection bias concern. Second, comparing innovation output of privatized firms and SOEs could result in misleading conclusions because of the fundamental but unobservable differences between these two groups of firms. Finally, expected changes in a firm's innovation output may cause its inclusion in the privatization program, leading to a reverse causality concern. Therefore, a correlation between privatization and innovation output may tell us little about the causal effect of privatization on innovation.
To tackle these endogeneity issues, we explore the plausibly exogenous variation in privatization expectations generated by a quasi-natural experiment in China: the split share structure reform (hereafter, the share reform) commenced in 2005. The share reform allows previously non-tradable shares, including those of SOEs held by the Chinese government, to be freely traded on stock exchanges. Thus, it effectively removes the legal and technical obstacles to transferring state-owned shares to public investors, and opens up the gate to further privatization. Before the share reform, government agents in charge of SOEs are legally and contractually prohibited from selling state-owned shares. After the share reform, further sale of state-owned shares becomes a feasible option for them. In this sense, the share reform leads to increased expectation about further privatization. Taking advantage of this unique setting, we attempt to provide an empirical study that examines the causal effect of privatization prospects on firm innovation.
The share reform in China offers a unique opportunity to examine the effect of privatization on firm innovation because of its three important features. First, the share reform is initiated for reasons other than the enhancement of technological innovation. Hence, it represents a quasi-natural experiment that is exogenous to firm innovation. Second, the share reform is mandatory so that no firms can endogenously choose whether and when to convert non-tradable shares. Finally, while the share reform is carried out simultaneously on both SOEs and non-SOEs, it generates expectations about further privatization only for SOEs, because the transfer from state to private ownership could occur in SOEs. This allows us to use non-SOEs as a benchmark for evaluating the innovation performance of SOEs. In Section 3, we provide more detailed discussion on the share reform and its advantages serving as a quasi-natural experiment.
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to study how innovation output of SOEs changes surrounding the share reform compared with that of non-SOEs. After performing a variety of diagnostic tests to ensure that the parallel trend assumption, the key identifying assumption of the DiD approach, is not violated, we find a positive effect of privatization prospects on firm innovation in both univariate and multivariate tests. Our regression results suggest that the expectation of privatization leads to a 13.4% increase in patent quantity and an 11.5% increase in patent quality for SOEs compared with non-SOEs.
Next, we perform robustness checks and placebo tests to make sure that our baseline results are not driven by reverse causality or by chance. First, although the share reform constitutes an exogenous shock to privatization expectation, there is still a concern that our baseline results might be driven by reverse causality. That is, changes in innovation productivity could trigger the share reform. Our discussion on the institutional background of the share reform in Section 3 suggests that this alternative argument is unlikely to be true. Nevertheless, we provide further assurance against the reverse causality argument by examining the dynamics of innovation output surrounding the share reform (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) . We do not find a prior trend in innovation output, but observe a larger increase in innovation output of SOEs compared with that of non-SOEs only after the share reform. Second, to address the concern that our DiD results could have been driven by chance, we run a placebo test that randomly and artificially assigns our sample firms into SOE and non-SOE groups and repeats the DiD regressions based on this simulated sample. We find that the DiD estimates obtained from this placebo test are on average zero. The evidence suggests that it is unlikely that our baseline results are driven by chance.
In further analysis, we explore two plausible underlying mechanisms through which privatization encourages firm innovation: better interest alignments between government agents and private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness. To this end, we examine how cross-sectional variation in conflicts of interest, as measured by related-party transactions, and stock price informativeness affect our main results. We find that the effect of the share reform is more pronounced for firms that can potentially benefit more through these two channels. Specifically, we observe that the DiD estimates are economically larger for firms with more related-party transaction and lower stock price informativeness before the reform.
We also confirm that, after the share reform, SOEs experience larger reductions in related-party transactions and larger increases in stock price informativeness than non-SOEs. Taken together, our evidence suggests that better interest alignments and improved stock price informativeness are two plausible underlying mechanisms through which privatization spurs innovation.
As of the concern that privatization may encourage the firms reduce effort once carrying less of social welfare responsibility, we investigate how provincial marketization level affects the post-reform innovation performances of SOEs. Less market economy oriented provinces can force firms to produce more innovation for social benefit rather than financial benefit. So one may concern that privatization can therefore seduce firms in those provinces engage in less innovation activities. It is also possible that improved interest alignments between the state and the minority shareholders can overcome this barrier so that the innovation activity can be in fact increased. To address those conjectures, we use the provincial level marketization index constructed by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) in our tests. The marketization index is widely regarded as a meaningful measure of a province's progress towards market economy (Lin et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2011) . We find that
SEOs from less market economy oriented provinces experience a greater increase in innovation output than those in high marketization provinces. These results support the view that better interest alignment is a mechanism through which privatization enhances innovation. This is because firms in low marketization provinces face more government interventions and, hence, are more adversely affected by the conflict of interest between government agents and private investors. Therefore, they can potentially benefit more from the share reform through the interest alignment channel. We further find that firms from low intellectual protection provinces and worse government-market relationship also experience in greater increase in innovation output. Our findings, however, are different from those documented by Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2017) that local intellectual protection encourages innovation for SOEs shifting control ownership to private party. A possible explanation is that the listed firms in our sample are much larger firms that rely on alternative mechanisms rather than formal institutions. As suggested by Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) , the large and influential listed firms in our sample can rely on informal social and economic mechanisms such as establishing political ties and other information relationships with different local authorities, to protect against ex post exploitation of innovation. The evidences we document along with Fang, Lerner and Wu (2017) suggest that China's stellar economic growth is not achieved using a one-size-fit-all formula. Instead, different sectors of the Chinese economy rely on different mechanisms for growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 presents background information about China's split share structure reform. Section 4 describes sample selection and reports summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main results.
Section 6 discusses possible mechanisms. Section 7 examines how local institutions alter our main results. Section 8 concludes.
Relation to the existing literature
Our paper is related to the literature on privatization. There has been a large strand of literature on the impact of privatization in both transition and non-transition economies.
2 Shleifer (1998) points out that the primary concern over state ownership is that government agents may use their control rights to engage in rent seeking and politically motivated resource allocation. Consistent with this view, Megginson et al. (1994) find that firms divested through SIPs experience significant improvements in operating performance. Goyal et al. (2014) show that firms pay higher dividends after privatization largely because of improved operating performance and mitigated agency costs. Gupta (2005) finds that privatization in India has a positive effect on firm profitability, productivity, and investment. Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014) find that state ownership is associated with lower firm-level stock price informativeness.
A few recent studies examine the consequences of China's split share structure reform, which is considered as an exogenous shock to privatization expectation. Firth, Lin and Zou (2010) find that state and mutual fund ownership have contrasting effects on the compensation ratio. Li et al. (2011) show that the compensation size is positively associated with the gain from risk-sharing and highlight the role of risk-sharing in China's privatization. Chen et al. (2012) find that the share reform leads to better incentive alignments between controlling and minority shareholders and relaxes financial constraints. Liao, Liu, and Wang (2014) show that the privatization expectation generated by the reform positively affects the profitability and governance of SOEs.
Our paper is also related to the emerging literature on motivating firm innovation. The empirical literature shows that various firm characteristics and economic forces can affect managerial incentives to invest in innovation. For example, institutional holding (Aghion et al., 2005; Aghion et al., 2013) , corporate venture capital (Chemmanur et al., 2014) , bankruptcy laws (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009 ), labor power (Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian, 2013; Bradley et al., 2017) , hedge fund activism (Brav et al., 2018) , stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2014) , shareholder litigation , bank interventions (Gu et al., 2017) , insider trading (Levine, Lin, and Wei, 2017) , technology spillovers (Byun, Oh, and Xia, 2017), financial innovation (Chang et al., 2017) , and failure tolerance (Manso, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2014 ) have all been found to affect managers' and employees' incentives to innovate. However, there has been a paucity of evidence on whether a causal relation exists between privatization and firm innovation. Our paper contributes to this line of research by providing the first rigorous empirical analysis on the issue.
A related study to ours is Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2007) , which finds that, among the SOEs experiencing control ownership switch from the state to private, the increase in innovation is larger among firms enjoying better local intellectual property right protection. Our study differs from theirs in the following important aspects. First, our experiment design provides more reliable evidence on the causal relation between privatization and innovation. Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2017) answer the question of whether or not provincial intellectual property protection differentiates the transfer ownership effect on innovation of the SOEs that switch into civiliancontrolled status. Given that there are many other ways the state can privatize the enterprises, there is a concern that changing control through sale of majority ownership can be endogenous. 4 Moreover, Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2017) include only former SOEs that switch 3 See He and Tian (2018) for a survey of the literature on finance and corporate innovation. 4 The Chinese government offers small SOEs altogether 10 different reform options, many of which do not involve transfer of ownership or change of majority control. In its policy guidelines for reforming small SOEs, Opinions on Reforming Small SOEs, the Chinese government offers small SOEs ten options: 1) converting into a limited liability company; 2) forming joint-stock cooperative system; 3) being acquired; 4) being leased or franchised without changing ownership; 5) selling assets; 6) setting up a joint venture with private companies; 7) declaring bankruptcy; 8) entrusting operations to more competent companies; 9) keeping the status quo; 10) other forms of reform.
into civilian-controlled status. If non-SOEs experience similar increases in innovation output, their evidence may reflect an upward time trend rather than the impact of privatization. In our paper, we address the first concern by exploiting the share reform as a natural experiment and the second concern by using non-SOEs as the control group. 
Institutional background of China's secondary privatization in 2005
Like in many other countries, the privatization process in China begins with the partial sales of equity in the stock market. 5 As the first milestone in China's privatization process, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are established in early 1990s, allowing approved firms to go public and issue exchange-listed tradable shares. By allowing SOEs to sell newly-issued stocks to private investors through the stock market, the government effectively transfers minority stakes of these enterprises to private owners. To minimize the 5 Most privatization programs begin with the partial sales of equity in the stock market (Gupta, 2005) . The government may choose to sell more shares afterwards if the situation allows. The speed of the process depends on social, economic, and political factors. Take India's privatization program, which starts in 1991, for example. From 1991 to 1999, the federal government sells an average of just 19.2% of equity in 40 of 258 industrial, financial, and service sector firms and majority stakes in none. Dinc and Gupta (2011) The split share structure turns out to be a major obstacle in the path toward further privatization. Starting from the late 1990s, the Chinese government launches several attempts to privatize more state-owned shares, all of which fail due to adverse stock market reactions.
These attempts cause adverse market reactions because they are viewed as breaching the agreement between the Chinese government and public investors on the non-tradability of state-owned shares. The Chinese government gradually realizes that further privatization could not be accomplished without removing the legacy dual share structure (Liao, Liu, and Wang, 2014) .
In April 2005, the Chinese government initiates the split share structure reform, the second major milestone in China's privatization process. The share reform involves mandatory conversion of all non-tradable shares into shares that are freely tradable on stock exchanges, subject to shareholder approvals and appropriate compensation to holders of tradable shares.
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The share reform specifies a time period during which large (and typically controlling)
shareholders of Chinese listed firms are required to convert their previously non-tradable shares into tradable shares. By the end of 2011, 99% of firms in our sample complete their reforms.
By converting all shares into tradable status, the share reform clears the pathway for privatizing more state-owned shares on the stock market. Before the share reform, government agents in charge of SOEs, such as controlling shareholders and senior executives, have low 6 Deng, Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's economic reform, repeatedly emphasizes that China should "cross the river by feeling the stones" (i.e., China should implement economic reforms step by step in a trial and error manner), By legally ensuring initial state control over most listed firms, the split share structure minimizes the potential political oppositions and economic risks associated with the reform. 7 Please refer to Liao, Liu and Wang (2015) for a detailed account of the negotiation process.
expectation about privatizing more state-owned shares on the stock market, because they are not allowed to do so both legally and contractually. After the share reform, they can reasonably expect that they will be able to sell state-owned shares on the market when necessary. In this sense, the share reform leads to an increase in privatization expectation, which, in turn, alters corporate decision making, including their innovation decisions.
The share reform is likely to generate exogenous variation in privatization expectations and provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of privatization on firm innovation because of its three important features. First, the share reform is initiated for reasons other than the enhancement of technological innovation. According to the blueprint of the share reform,
Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Share Reform, Opening, and Steady
Growth of Capital Markets, issued by the State Council on January 31, 2004, the goals of the share reform are to optimize ownership structure, improve corporate governance, increase capital returns, and promote financial market development. Based on our earlier discussion about the institutional background of the share reform, it is clear that the share reform aims to resolve the split share structure that is stemmed from the transition of China's economy from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, rather than to promote or demote innovation. Hence, the share reform provides a quasi-natural experiment that is exogenous to firm innovation.
Second, the share reform is mandatory. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (Firth, Lin, and Zou, 2010) . The mandatory nature of the share reform implies that no firms can choose whether and when to convert non-tradable shares.
Instead, the actual timing of the reform depends on the time required to implement and complete the reform procedures, i.e., the time it takes to communicate with shareholders and to obtain the necessary votes.
Finally, the share reform is carried out simultaneously on both SOEs and non-SOEs, allowing us to use non-SOEs as a benchmark for evaluating the innovation performance of SOEs. Through the share reform, both types of firms convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares. However, the non-tradable shares of SOEs are held mainly by entities affiliated with the government and those of non-SOEs are held mainly by private investors. Thus, the removal of the split share structure generates expectations about future privatization (i.e., future transfer of equity stakes from government to private investors) only for SOEs, but not for non-SOEs.
By comparing the post-reform innovation output of SOEs (i.e., the treatment firms) with those of non-SOEs (i.e., the control firms), we can separate out the net effect of privatization on corporate innovation, uncontaminated by other unobservable firm characteristics or economic conditions.
A potential concern about our empirical strategy is that the selection of firms or industries that are state-owned, and therefore the firms or industries being privatized, might not be random. While this is a reasonable concern and a challenge faced by all privatization studies, we mitigate the concern by including firm fixed effects in all regressions to absorb timeinvariant unobservable firm characteristics that may be correlated with the selection of state ownership.
Sample construction and descriptive statistics
We obtain information about our sample firms from several sources. 
Measuring innovation
There are three types of patents under the Chinese patent law: invention patents, utility model patents, and design patents. Chinese invention patents are granted for a new technical solution relating to a product, a process, or an improvement, which is similar to the U.S. utility patents. The Chinese utility model patents are granted for new and practical technical solutions related to the shape and/or structure of a product, which is similar to European and Japanese utility model patents. The utility model patents protect new, functional aspects of a product that do not meet the higher inventiveness level required for an invention patent. The Chinese design patents are granted for new designs related to the shape, pattern or their combinations, or the combination of color, shape, and/or pattern that is aesthetically pleasing and industrially applicable. In other words, a design patent protects the "look" of a product that makes it recognizable. The SIPO database covers all three types of patents. For each patent, SIPO provides information on patent application date, application ID, publication ID, granting date, and patent ID along with the names of inventors and applicants.
Because design patents involve limited technological advancements, we construct our innovation outcome measures using only invention and utility model patents. We extract invention and utility model patent applications filed by (and eventually granted to) our sample firms, including those filed by their subsidiaries, from the SIPO database and use them to construct two measures for a firm's innovative outcomes. 8 Our first measure of innovation output is, Pat, defined as the total number of invention and utility model patents that are applied by and eventually granted to a firm in a year. We define the variable by application year rather than by granting year, because previous research shows that application year is better able to capture the actual time of innovation (Griliches, Pakes and Hall, 1988) . To address the concerns related to variable skewness, we use the natural logarithm of one plus Pat as the main innovation outcome measure in our analysis.
A potential concern about this variable is that it measures only the quantity but not the quality of innovation. It is possible that, after the share reform, firms may switch to the strategy of producing a larger number of patents at the expense of quality. If so, an increase in Pat does not necessarily mean improved innovation performance. We therefore need a measure that captures patent quality. The existing innovation literature uses the number of future citations a patent receives as a measure for patent quality, assuming that more influential and higher impact patents receive a larger number of subsequent citations. A practical difficulty we face in this study is that the SIPO database does not provide sufficient and reliable information on citations for Chinese patents. Thus, we choose to measure a patent's quality based on its originality. Based on the Chinese patent law, invention patents are the most original ones among all three types of patents. As a result, we use InvPat, defined as the number of invention patent applications filed by (and eventually granted to) a firm in a year, as a proxy for a firm's innovation quality. To address issues related to skewness, we use the natural logarithm of one plus InvPat in our analysis. If we observe significant post-reform improvements using both Pat and InvPat, it helps to mitigate the concern that firms may switch to the strategy of producing a larger number of low quality patents.
Defining SOEs and control variables
We define a firm's SOE status based on its state ownership information in the year prior to the firm's share reform. We obtain ownership information from the CSMAR database. We first identify civilian-run firms by matching our sample firms with the CCER civilian-run firm database and label them as non-SOEs. We then check whether the largest controlling shareholders of the remaining firms are affiliated with the Chinese government by manually searching their background information through annual reports and public press. 9 We define a firm in our remaining sample to be a SOE if its largest shareholder is affiliated with the Chinese government and holds at least 25% of the firm's outstanding shares. 10 This procedure identifies 801 SOEs and 488 non-SOEs in our sample.
As discussed in Section 3, China's secondary privatization is featured with mandatory conversion of non-tradable shares of listed firms to tradable shares. We define the share reform completion year as the year in which a firm's non-tradable share conversion proposal is finalized. Following the innovation literature, we control for a vector of firm and industry characteristics that may affect a firm's innovation output. Our control variables include firm size, age, leverage, asset tangibility, profitability (measured by ROA), and sales growth rate. Table 1 Panel A provides detailed definitions of the variables used in our analysis. In Figure 1 , we present innovation output of SOEs and non-SOEs surrounding the share reform. The solid line in Panel A represents the average total number of invention and utility model patents produced by SOEs, and the dash line displays the number of invention and utility model patents produced by non-SOEs. The number of patents is trending closely in parallel for the two groups in the four years leading up to the share reform, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption of the DiD approach is likely satisfied. However, the gap between the two lines widens after the share reform because SOEs increase their patent generation at a faster pace than non-SOEs. Panel B displays the number of invention patents produced by the two groups of firms. Non-SOEs increase their invention patents at a relatively stable speed over time. The number of invention patents produced by SOEs initially grows at a slower speed than non-SOEs. However, SOEs increase their invention patent production more rapidly after the share reform, which widens the difference in invention patent counts between these two groups of firms. The figures in both panels show that, after the share reform, SOEs enhance their innovation productivity more than non-SOEs.
Descriptive statistics
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Main results
A standard approach to evaluate the effect of privatization on innovation is to run an OLS estimation that regresses a firm's innovation output variable on a variable that captures the privatization program in China. However, as we discussed before, this approach suffers from sample selection and endogeneity concerns. First, a sample of traditional SIPs is likely to bias towards very largest firms sold during the privatization program, causing a selection bias concern. Second, there are fundamental but unobservable differences between SOEs and non-SOEs. These differences could be related to innovation output, leading to spurious or biased inferences. Third, changes in a firm's innovation output could cause its inclusion in the privatization program, leading to concerns on reverse causality. Therefore, a correlation between privatization and innovation output obtained from a naï ve OLS regression tells us little about the causal effect of privatization on innovation.
Our identification strategy is to exploit the plausibly exogenous increase in privatization expectations generated by a quasi-natural experiment in China, that is, the split share structure reform commented in 2005. We adopt a DiD approach to examine the effect of privatization prospects on innovation. The DiD approach has some key advantages. First, the DiD methodology rules out omitted time trends that are correlated with privatization and innovation in both SOEs (the treatment group) and non-SOEs (the control group). Second, the DiD approach controls for constant unobserved differences between the treatment and the control groups that may bias our estimation. The quasi-natural experiment setting also has a key advantage: the share reform takes place in different times for different firms. This feature allows us to avoid a common identification difficulty faced by studies with a single exogenous shock. That is, potential omitted variables that coincide with the shock could directly affect firm innovation. If this is the case, the causal effect of privatization is still not identified.
We start with a univariate DiD analysis in a sample of SOEs and propensity score matched non-SOEs in Section 5.1. We then perform the DiD tests in a multivariate regression framework in Section 5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we perform dynamic analysis and placebo test to support our baseline results.
Univariate DiD analysis
For each SOE, we select a matched non-SOE using a propensity score matching algorithm.
When applying the propensity score matching procedure, we first estimate a probit model based on all sample firms with non-missing matching variables in the year prior to the share reform.
In the probit model, the dependent variable is a SOE dummy that equals one for SOEs and zero otherwise. We include a vector of firm characteristics in the probit regression, including firm size, net leverage, ROA, sales growth, firm age, asset tangibility, and patent growth. We define patent growth as the average annual change in Pat over three years prior to the share reform. We include this variable to ensure the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption of the DiD approach. 12 All other variables are measured at the fiscal year end before the share reform. In addition, we include industry and year dummies in the probit model.
We report the probit model results in Column (1) of Table 2 Panel A (labeled as "PreMatch"). The estimation results suggest that the specification captures a significant amount of variation in the choice variable, as indicated by a pseudo-R 2 of 10.1% and a p-value from the χ 2 test of the overall model fitness well below 0.001. We then perform a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching procedure, using the predicted probabilities (propensity scores)
obtained from the estimation in Column (1). Specifically, we match each SOE firm (labeled as a treatment firm) to a non-SOE firm (labeled as a control firm) with the closest propensity score. We end up with 418 one-to-one pairs of matched firms (836 observations).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Because the validity of the DiD estimate depends critically on the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption, we undertake three diagnostic tests to check whether this assumption holds. First, as we discussed before, Figure 1 shows that the number of patents is trending closely in parallel for both SOEs and non-SOEs in the four years leading up to the share reform.
This observation suggests that the parallel trend assumption of the DiD is satisfied.
Second, we re-estimate the probit model using the matched sample and report the estimation results in Column (2) of Table 2 Panel A (labeled as "Post-Match"). None of the independent variables is statistically significant. In particular, the insignificant coefficient for pre-reform patent growth suggests that the treatment and control firms exhibit a similar growth rate in innovation outcomes before the share reform. In addition, the pesudo-R 2 drops dramatically from 10.1% prior to the matching to 1.3% post the matching, and the χ 2 test for the overall model fitness suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the coefficient estimates of independent variables in column (2) are zero (i.e., the p-value is 0.656).
Finally, we report the univariate comparisons in firm characteristics between the treatment and control firms and their corresponding t-statistics in the year before the share reform in Table 2 Panel B. None of the observed differences between the treatment and control firms' pre-reform characteristics is statistically significant. In particular, the univariate comparison for the pre-reform patent growth is statistically insignificant and economically small, suggesting the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption.
Overall, the diagnostic test results show that the propensity score matching process has removed meaningful observable differences in pre-reform characteristics between the treatment and control groups and the parallel trend assumption is not violated. As a result, the matching procedure increases the likelihood that the observed difference in changes of innovation output between SOEs and non-SOEs is caused by the share reform. Ln(Pat) by first subtracting the total number of invention and utility model patents that a firm generates during the four-year period preceding the share reform from that during the four-year period after the share reform for each treatment or control firm. Columns (1) and (2) present the average differences for, respectively, the treatment group and control group. Column (3) reports the DiD estimation of Ln(Pat), which is the difference between columns (1) and (2).
The DiD estimate for Ln(InvPat) is calculated in a similar way and is reported in the second row of Panel C.
The results reported in Panel C columns (1) and (2) show that both the treatment and control firms experience improvements in innovation output after the share reform. More importantly, the DiD estimates of the innovation output variables reported in column (3) are all positive and statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level. This finding suggests that the post-reform increase in innovation output is larger for the treatment group than for the control group. The economic effect is sizable. The DiD estimate for Ln(InvPat) is 0.203, suggesting that, compared to the average change in Ln(InvPat) in our matched sample (0.5995), the treatment firms experience an approximate 33.8% larger increase in invention patent counts than matched control firms over a nine-year period surrounding the share reform. 13 The magnitude of the DiD estimate for Ln(Pat) is also economically sizable.
The evidence from the univariate DiD tests suggests that SOEs experience a larger postreform increase in innovation output than non-SOEs. Thus, the privatization expectation generated by the share reform appears to have a positive effect on innovation output.
Multivariate DiD analysis
In this section, we perform the DiD test in a multivariate regression framework.
Specifically, we estimate the model in equation (1) in the full sample.
, +4 = + × , + ′ , + + + ,
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. suggests that, compared to patent quality prior to the share reform, SOEs exhibit a 11.5% larger increase in innovation quality than non-SOEs four years after the share reform. Because the DiD estimates are significantly positive in both columns, the evidence suggests that SOEs experience substantially larger improvement in both patent quantity and patent quality than non-SOEs surrounding the share reform.
14 We choose to use a four-year-ahead innovation output variable as the dependent variable because it generally takes time for innovation processes to generate observable outputs due to the fact that innovation represents a long-term investment in intangible assets. Our main results, however, do not change if we use the patent output variables two or three years ahead as the dependent variables.
Taken together, the evidence from the univariate and multivariate DiD tests suggests that SOEs experience larger improvement in innovation output than non-SOEs after the share reform. The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the privatization expectation generated by the share reform has a positive effect on innovation output of Chinese firms.
Dynamics of innovation output surrounding the share reform
In this subsection, we examine the dynamics of innovation output surrounding the share reform to address the potential reverse causality concern. As discussed earlier, although the share reform represents a plausibly exogenous shock to privatization expectations, it is still possible that our results are driven by reverse causality. That is, changes in innovation productivity may trigger the share reform. For example, the government may choose to launch the share reform in response to improved innovative productivity. Another concern is that there may be some pre-existing trends in innovation output between SOEs and non-SOEs that are not captured by our visual check in Figure 1 . If they exist, these pre-existing trends could drive our results even in the absence of the share reform.
To address the reverse causality concern, we examine the dynamics of innovation output surrounding the share reform in the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) . Specifically,
we estimate the following model: 
where Before -1 i,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is one year before a firm completes the share reform and zero otherwise. Current 0 i,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is in the share reform completion year and zero otherwise. Similarly, After 1 i,t , After 2 i,t , and After 3 i,t are dummy variables that equal one if the observation is the first, second, and third year after a firm completes the share reform and zero otherwise, respectively. After 4+ i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all years starting from the fourth year after the share reform and zero otherwise. All other variables have the same definitions as in equation (1). If there is a pre-existing trend in the innovation output of SOEs and non-SOEs, we should observe statistically significant coefficient estimates of 1 and 2 .
[Insert Table 4 Here] We report the results estimating equation (2) in Table 4 . 15 The coefficient estimates on 1 and 2 are both statistically insignificant and economically negligible, suggesting that SOEs and non-SOEs do not exhibit significantly different trends in innovation output prior to the share reform. 16 In contrast, we find that the coefficient estimates on 4 , and 6 are positive and significant in both columns. In Column (2), 5 is also significantly positive. The estimation results suggest that SOEs start to exhibit a higher level of innovation output than non-SOEs two years after the share reform.
Besides addressing the reverse causality concern, the dynamic test results allow us to rule out an alternative explanation of our main results, which argues that the contracting environment for SOEs has changed after the share reform. In the new contracting environment, SOEs enjoy less protection from the government than before and rely more on legal protection for intellectual properties. Thus, they may choose to file more patent applications even if they experience no real improvement in innovation productivity. If this alternative explanation is true, we should observe an immediate increase in patent applications for SOEs after the reform.
Yet, our estimation results suggest that the increase occurs starting from two years after the reform, which is consistent with the notion that it takes time to observe innovation output improvement because innovation represents a long-term investment in intangible assets.
Placebo tests
This section addresses the concern that our DiD results could have been driven by chance instead of reflecting the causal effect of privatization expectations. Hence, we conduct a placebo test by running simulations that artificially assign SOE or non-SOE status to our sample firms. Specifically, in each simulation, we randomly draw 801 "SOEs" from the pool of all firms (SOEs and non-SOEs) in the pre-reform sample. We then treat the remaining 488 firms as "non-SOEs". We perform the DiD analysis, as specified in equation (1), on this simulated sample and then repeat the simulation process 5,000 times.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
In Table 5 , we summarize the distributions of the simulated DiD estimates (i.e., the coefficient estimates of SOE×Post) by reporting statistics including the mean, 5 th percentile, 25 th percentile, median, 75 th percentile, 95 th percentile, and standard deviation. We also report 15 Because the regressions in Table 3 require information about innovation outcomes 4 years ahead, the last 3 years of observations are not used in regressions in Table 3 . Thus, there are more observations in Table 4 than in Table 3 . 16 In unreported analysis, we confirm that our results do not change if we include × , −2 as an additional control variable. Before -2 i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation is two years before a firm completes the share reform and zero otherwise. the distribution of the corresponding t-statistics. Although the mean and median of simulated DiD estimates are positive, they are much smaller in magnitude than those reported in Table 3 .
In addition, their corresponding t-statistics is small and statistically insignificant. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the DiD estimates obtained from this placebo test are zero.
This finding suggests that our main results are unlikely to be driven by chance.
Plausible underlying mechanisms
So far, our empirical results suggest that there is a causal link between privatization prospects and firm innovation. In this section, we explore plausible underlying economic mechanisms through which privatization enhances firm innovation. We hypothesize that privatization encourages corporate innovation through two possible underlying mechanisms:
better interest alignment between government agents and other shareholders and improved stock price informativeness.
Interest alignments
The first plausible mechanism that allows privatization to promote innovation is better interest alignment between government agents and minority shareholders. SOEs are arguably owned by all people in China, but controlled by government agents (i.e., controlling shareholders and SOE executives). According to Shleifer (1998), the primary concern over state ownership is that government agents may use their control rights to engage in rent seeking and politically motivated resource allocation activities. For example, government agents could request SOEs to boost local employment or to engage in projects that are strategically important for the government although these activities are not at the best interest of minority shareholders.
They could even directly exploit minority shareholders through various tunneling activities (Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010) .
The split share structure exacerbates the conflict of interest between government agents and minority shareholders. Because state-owned shares are non-tradable, government agents operating SOEs are evaluated based on the book value of firm assets, revenues, or short term profits. Thus, they have limited incentives to invest in long-term, value-enhancing projects, such as innovation, that can boost the firms' stock prices and market value. After the share reform, state owned shares become market priced and legally transferable. Government agents will be evaluated based on the market value, rather than book value, of state-owned shares.
Moreover, to generate more proceeds from expected future sales of state owned shares, government agents will have more incentives to boost stock prices. As a result, they will be more willing to invest in long-term, risky project that can enhance firm value and stock price, such as innovation projects.
If the interest alignment between government agents and minority shareholders is an underlying economic mechanism, the positive effect of privatization on innovation should be more pronounced for firms with more serious conflicts of interest between the two groups before the share reform. Following Liao, Liu, and Wang (2014) , we use related-party transactions as a proxy for potential conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and outside investors. Through related-party transactions, firm resources can be transferred between listed firms and affiliated entities. The existing literature suggests that related-party transactions are one of the most widely used rent-seeking methods in China (e.g., Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2006; Liao, Liu, and Wang, 2014) and represents serious conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and outside investor. Thus, we use the volume of related-party transactions to capture the conflict of interest faced by firms. We define RelatedTrans as the amount of transactions with related parties scaled by lagged total assets. We obtain information on related-party transactions from the CSMAR database.
We partition our sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm's average RelatedTrans, calculated using the most recently available four years of data before the reform, is above or below the sample median. In the presence of incentive misalignments, a larger fraction of related-party transactions will be conducted on terms unfavorable to outside investors. Therefore, firms with above median related-party transactions are considered to have a higher pre-reform exposure to conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and outside investors. These firms should benefit more from improved incentive alignments resulting from the share reform. To test this conjecture, we perform the DiD test in equation (1) [Insert Table 6 Here] Table 6 Panel A presents the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) RelatedTrans than for those with below-median RelatedTrans. We test the equivalence of the DiD estimates between the high and low RelatedTrans groups using a Wald test and report the test statistics at the bottom of the table. Both test statistics are significant at the 1% or 5% level.
Hence, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the DiD estimates are the same across these two groups of firms. The evidence in Table 6 Panel A suggests that the effect of privatization expectations on innovation is more pronounced for firms with more related-party transactions and hence more severe conflicts of interest before the share reform.
The validity of this mechanism relies on the premise that the conflict of interest between government agents and minority shareholders of SOEs is indeed mitigated after the share reform. We next examine this premise in the DiD framework and report the results in Table 6 Panel B. We estimate equation (1) after replacing the dependent variable with RelatedTrans.
The coefficient estimate of SOE×Post is negative and significant, suggesting that SOEs experience a larger reduction in related-party transactions than non-SOEs surrounding the share reform. The evidence is consistent with the view that privatization helps to align the interest between government agents in charge of SOEs and minority shareholders of SOEs. Taken together, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that better interest alignment between government agents and minority shareholders is a plausible underlying economic mechanism through which privatization prospects triggered by the share reform promote firm innovation.
Stock price informativeness
The second possible mechanism through which privatization spurs firm innovation is improved stock price informativeness. The share reform allows more shares to be freely traded on stock exchanges, leading to increases in firms' stock liquidity. Because the profit from informed trading increases with liquidity, investors would have stronger incentives to collect more information about the firms' fundamentals after the share reform (Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) . Moreover, the privatization expectation generated by the share reform alters government agents' incentives, motivating them to engage in less politically motivated resource allocations and run SOEs more like profit-maximizing entities. This should make fundamental analysis more valuable when determining investment worthiness of SOEs than before. As a result, more market participants should be willing to spend time and resources on collecting and analyzing information about SOEs.
Financial markets can aggregate the information gathered by many investors who, though individually less informed, are collectively more informed than firm managers (Grossman, 1976; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) . The resulting improvement in stock price informativeness could enhance firm innovation for two reasons. First, as Gupta (2005) points out, various stakeholders can use the information contained in stock prices to monitor managers more effectively. Better monitoring could lead to more efficient corporate decisions on investments, especially investments in long-term, risky projects, such as innovation. Second, more informative stock prices allow firm managers to learn new information and insights that they may not be aware of. These pieces of information could be very relevant and valuable to their innovation decisions. 17 Hence, improved stock price informativeness is likely an underlying economic mechanism through which privatization prospects promote firm innovation.
To explore this mechanism, we perform the DiD tests on subsamples of firms with different levels of stock price informativeness before the share reform. If our conjecture is supported, the positive effect of the share reform on innovation should be more pronounced for firms that can potentially benefit more through enhanced price informativeness, i.e., firms with less informative stock prices before the share reform. Following Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010), we use the stock price non-synchronicity measure as a proxy for stock price informativeness. We define Info as the logit transformation of (1-2 ), where 2 is obtained from estimating the regression model in equation (3) using daily stock return in each year.
In equation (3), Reti,t is daily stock returns for firm i in day t, MktRett is value-weighted Chinese market returns, and IndRett is value-weighted industry returns at day t. Following Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) , we require at least 200 trading days of return data when estimating Info.
Previous research argues that Info captures the amount of firm-specific information reflected in its stock price (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010) . The rationale is that if a firm's stock price contains more firm-specific information, then the market model explains a smaller proportion of stock price fluctuation, leading to a lower 2 (i.e., higher Info).
[Insert Table 7 Here]
We partition the sample based on whether a firm's average Info, calculated using the most recently available four years of data before the reform, is below or above the sample median.
Then we estimate the model in equation (1) separately on each subsample and report the estimation results in Table 7 Panel A. Similar to in Table 6 , we report the results for firms with below-median Info in columns (1) and (3) and those for firms with above-median Info in columns (2) and (4).
The coefficient estimates of the DiD variable, SOE×Post, are statistically significant only in the subsample of firms with low pre-reform stock price informativeness, but not in the subsample with high pre-reform stock price informativeness. The magnitudes of the DiD estimates are also over four times larger for firms with low pre-reform stock price informativeness than for firms with high stock price informativeness. We conduct a Wald test to test the equivalence of the DiD estimates between the two regressions. The p-values of the tests are significant at the 1% or 5% level, suggesting that the positive effect of privatization prospects on firm innovation is more pronounced for firms with low pre-reform stock price informativeness.
The above analysis is based on the rationale that the share reform improves the stock price informativeness of SOEs more than that of non-SOEs. To verify this premise, we examine the change in stock price informativeness surrounding the share reform in a DiD framework and report the results in Panel B of Table 7 . We estimate equation (1) using info as the dependent variable. The DiD estimate is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that SOEs experience a larger improvement in stock price informativeness than their non-SOE peers after the share reform. Taken together, the evidence reported in this subsection supports the view that improved stock price informativeness is a plausible underlying mechanism through which privatization prospects triggered by the share reform promote firm innovation.
Privatization expectation, local marketization, and innovation output
In this section, we examine how local marketization level affects the post-reform innovation performances of SOEs with non-SOEs as control. We divide all provinces in China into two groups by their marketization index value as of 2004. Constructed by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI), the provincial level marketization is widely used in the existing literature to capture a province's progress towards market economy (Lin et al., 2016; Wang, Wong and Xia, 2008; Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2011) . A higher index value indicates more market economy oriented. The marketization index comprises of several component sub-indexes, among which there are a sub-index for local IPR protection and a sub-index for government-market relation. The IPR protection sub-index and the government intervention sub-index are highly correlated with the overall marketization index. Thus, firms in high marketization provinces tend to enjoy better local IPR protection and face less government intervention than those in low marketization provinces.
Local institutions can affect the post-reform innovation performances of SOEs due to the level of control the local government has on the sample firms. The local government can force the SOEs in their jurisdiction to engage more social welfare oriented innovation. Such activity can be reduced since the decision power of those SOEs switching to the market. As a consequence, the firms in low market oriented provinces may reduce innovation outcome by cutting more of the welfare innovations. On the other hand, because firms in low marketization provinces face more government intervention, they tend to be more adversely affected by the conflict of interests between government agents and private shareholders. These firms can potentially benefit more from the share reform through the interest alignment channel. In other words, the positive impact of the share reform is also possible in low market economy oriented provinces.
To test these two arguments, we estimate our baseline model separately for the high and low marketization groups and report the estimation results in Table 8 Panel A. For the low marketization group reported in Columns (1) and (3), the DiD estimates are positive and significant at the 1% level. In Columns (2) and (4) in which we report the results for firms in high marketization provinces, however, the DiD estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Take the results in Columns (3) and (4) for example. The coefficient estimates of SOE×Post suggest that, in provinces with low marketization, SOEs experience a 19.7% larger increase in invention patent than non-SOEs four years after the share reform. In provinces with high marketization, however, the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs is much smaller and statistically insignificant. The results in Table 8 Panel A are consistent with the interest alignment argument.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
We next divide the sample firms by the government-market relation sub-index, which measures the relation between the government and market in a province. Firms in provinces with lower government-market relation sub-index values are subject to more government intervention and hence are more adversely affected by the conflict of interest between government agents and private shareholders. We estimate our baseline model separately for each group and report the estimation results in column (1) to (4) The results in of Table 8 so far support the view that better interest alignment is a channel through which privatization enhances innovation. We then examine the effect more directly with the IPR protection sub-index in Columns (5) to (8) of Panel B. Once, again, we find that firms in low market economy oriented (i.e., provinces with poorer IPR protection) experience a greater increase in innovation output after the share reform. The evidence suggests that the interest alignment effect outweighs the IPR protection effect for the listed firms in our sample.
Our finding complement the finding in Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2017) in that Chinese economy rely on different mechanisms for growth. Our sample consists of the largest Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shengzhen stock exchanges. On average they are more than 90 times larger in assets than those examined in of Fang, Lerner, and Wu (2017) . Because of the large size and important roles played by our sample firms in the economy, they can establish political ties and other informal relationships with different local authorities, which could help protect themselves against ex post exploitation. As a result, these large listed SOEs do not rely on local IPR institutions to protect their intellectual properties.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effect of privatization on corporate innovation. This topic is of interest to academics, practitioners, and policy makers not only because innovation is crucial for a nation's economic growth and competitive advantage but also because policy makers and regulators could alter laws and regulations to achieve privatization. To tackle this research question and address endogeneity concerns, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in privatization expectations generated by China's split share structure reform commenced in
2005.
Using a DiD approach, we show that privatization prospects have a positive effect on technological innovation. Additional tests suggest that our findings are not driven by chance or by pre-existing trends in innovation output before the share reform. We further show that better aligned interest between government agents and private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness are two plausible underlying economic mechanisms through which privatization prospects enhance firm innovation. in the patent dataset to firm and subsidiary names, using the procedure described below.
First, we standardize both firm (subsidiary) names and application entity names.
Second, we generate all possible pairs of standardized firm (subsidiary) names and standardized application entity names. For each pair, we calculate a fuzzy matching score using the SAS COMPGED procedure.
Third, we organize two groups of researchers and research assistants to manually check all pairs with fuzzy matching scores below 150. In determining whether a firm (subsidiary) is indeed a match to an application entity, we also consider such information as address and industry. When necessary, we search for information about the entities on the Internet. Both research groups go over the entire sample. Afterwards, three researchers compare the matching results from the two groups. In a small number of cases, the two groups disagree. The three researchers settle the disagreements by vote.
Fourth, three researchers randomly pick 1,500 firm year combinations and manually search for the patent applications filed by each firm in each year on the SIPO website. The search results are compared with the results from our matching procedure. 
Patent Growth
Patent growth, defined as mean value of (Patt-Patt-1) in the 3-year period before the share reform RelatedTrans Total amount of related-party transactions scaled by lagged total assets.
Info
The logit transformation of 1-2 , where 2 is obtained from estimating the regression model specified in Equation (3) using daily stock returns Sample selection begins with all firms with non-missing matching variables and non-missing innovation outcome variables in the year prior to the share reform. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching, without replacement, on a set of observable firm characteristics. Panel A reports parameter estimates from the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores for the treatment and control groups. The dependent variable in the probit model is the SOE dummy. The "Pre-Match" column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate the propensity scores for matching SOE and non-SOE firms. The "PostMatch" column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control pairs after matching. Definitions of all other variables are listed in Panel A of 
